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Effect 
Timothy Hatton and Audrey Lim  
n 26 August 2001 a Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, rescued 433 
asylum seekers from their vessel the KM Palapa 1 that was in distress in 
the stretch of ocean between Christmas Island and the coast of Indonesia.  
At the insistence of the rescued passengers, the captain of the Tampa asked the 
Australian government for permission to land them on Christmas Island — a 
request that was refused.  There followed a week-long standoff while the world 
watched the drama unfold.  Eventually a settlement was reached under which a 
third of the passengers were taken to New Zealand and the remainder to the small 
Pacific island of Nauru, in exchange for an aid package of AUD 20 million from 
the Australian government.  The Tampa saga redefined Australian asylum policy 
in the eyes of the world and it was watched keenly from Europe where stories 
about the clandestine entry of asylum seekers had been regularly hitting the 
headlines for a decade.   
Throughout the 1990s the countries of the then EU-15 had grappled with the 
issue of mounting numbers of unsolicited asylum applications, a number that 
increased from 92,410 in 1982 to a peak of 675,455 a decade later before falling to 
about 300,000 per annum for the rest of the 1990s.  European governments 
progressively toughened their policies in an atmosphere of popular backlash 
against asylum seekers that increasingly painted them as illegals and scroungers, 
or at best as ‘economic migrants’.  Those policies took the form of tightening 
access to individual countries’ borders, toughening refugee determination 
procedures and providing conditions for asylum seekers that were less and less 
hospitable.  They were aimed at deterrence and they were intended as a clear 
message to asylum seekers: ‘don’t come here’.  Yet there is disagreement about 
the effectiveness of such policies in the European context.  Some have found that 
asylum seekers interviewed after arrival had only the vaguest notion about their 
host country’s policy.  Some suggest that the fall in applications after 1992 owed 
much to changing conditions in source countries and relatively little to policies in 
destination countries.  And others point out that trends in applications across the 
countries of the EU apparently bear little relation to differences in the toughness 
and the timing of policy changes in the respective EU countries (see Zetter et al., 
2003; Theilemann, 2003; Hatton, 2004).   
In this paper we examine the links between asylum policies and the flow of 
asylum applications in Australia.  While Australia was the focus of attention (and 
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a good deal of opprobrium) in August and September 2001, much less attention 
has been given to subsequent events.  Here we look in detail at the evolution of 
policy and its effects on asylum applications before and after the Tampa incident.  
We shall argue that effective deterrence of asylum applications involves three 
elements, not just one.  The first is the policy stance itself, which has a number of 
different dimensions and may be more or less draconian in its treatment of asylum 
seekers.  The second is the enforcement of those policies.  Policies that look tough 
but that are relatively easy to circumvent are unlikely to be an effective deterrent.  
And third, there is the effective communication of the country’s policy stance to 
the world in general and to potential asylum seekers in particular.  These three 
elements — tough policies, credible enforcement, and effective communication — 
are standard criteria for effectiveness in other areas of policy such as regulation.  
We shall argue that these elements came together in Australia after the Tampa 
affair.  In this sense the Australian government achieved its goal of deterrence.  
Our purpose here is only to show that policy was ultimately effective in achieving 
its goal — we do not argue that the goal itself is desirable.   
The Evolution of Policy in Australia 
Like most other countries, the fundamental basis for Australia’s asylum policy is 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, originally signed in Geneva in 
1951.  The two key provisions of the Refugee Convention are the definition of a 
refugee – someone who is outside his or her country of normal residence and has a 
‘well founded fear of persecution’ (Article 1), and the so-called non-refoulement 
clause that prevents a refugee from being returned to a territory where his or her 
life or freedom would be threatened (Article 33).  Countries that are signatories to 
the Convention are obliged to admit any foreign national who is on their territory, 
and who claims asylum, to a formal process that determines the status of the 
individual as a refugee.  Those deemed to qualify must be granted refugee status 
under the terms of the Convention, although this does not necessarily mean 
permanent residence except insofar as it would be implied by the non-refoulement 
clause.  In principle this right must be accorded to a potentially unlimited number 
of genuine refugees.  But there are many ways that policy can be used to limit the 
numbers while still observing the letter of Convention law, if not its spirit.   
Most of the refugees who were admitted to Australia were not ‘spontaneous’ 
asylum seekers who claimed asylum after arriving in Australia, but were part of 
organised resettlement programmes overseen by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  In 1981 a Special Humanitarian Program 
was established that afforded sanctuary to those whose persecution would not be 
severe enough to qualify as a refugee under the Convention but who have close 
ties, such as relatives, in Australia.  And in 1991 a Special Assistance Category 
was established for those escaping civil disorder but not necessarily in fear of 
persecution as defined under the Convention.  A target of 12,000 admissions per 
year for these categories in total was established in the 1980s and continued in the 
1990s.  The other categories are for so-called ‘onshore’ refugees — those who 
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arrived in Australia, either legally or illegally, claimed asylum, and were granted 
refugee status.   
The number of visas granted under these various categories in the decade 
from 1993/4 is shown in Table 1.   
Table 1:  Refugee and Humanitarian Visas Granted in Australia, 
1993/4 to 20002/3 
Year Refugee Special 
Humanitarian 
Program 
Special 
Assistance 
Category 
Onshore 
Refugees 
Total 
1993/4 4,300 2,500 5,800 1,890 14,490 
1994/5 3,990 3,680 5,500 1,480 14,700 
1995/6 4,640 3,500 6,900 1,200 16,250 
1996/7 3,330 2,580 3,700 2,250 11,900 
1997/8 4,010 4,640 1,820 1,590 12,060 
1998/9 3,990 5,350 1,190 1,830 11,360 
1999/2000 3,800 3,050 650 2,460 9,960 
2000/01 4,000 3,120 880 5,740 13,730 
2001/02 4,160 4,260 40 3,900 12,350 
2002/03 4,380 7,280 -- 870 12,530 
 
Source: DIMIA, (2003):29. 
Note: The Onshore Refugees category includes a small number of temporary 
humanitarian visas.   
 
Onshore refugees have only ever been a minority in the humanitarian 
program as a whole, but their share rose from 12.5 percent in 1995/6-1997/8 to 
nearly 28.6 percent in 1998/9-2000/1, falling sharply thereafter.  To put this into 
the context of total migration, between 1995/6 and 2002/3 about 80,000 per 
annum were admitted under the various streams of the migration program.  The 
share of the humanitarian program in total admissions (migration plus 
humanitarian) declined from 15.2 percent in 1995/6-1997/8 to 13.8 percent in 
1998/9-2000/1 and 10.9 percent in 2001/2-2002/3.   
In the 1980s a number of initiatives were taken under the refugee and 
humanitarian programs, mainly for refugees from such places as the Soviet Union, 
East Timor, Mozambique and Cambodia.  In addition to these there were periodic 
arrivals of boat people that date back to the Vietnam War.  The policy of 
mandatory detention for unauthorised boat arrivals, which had existed since 1958, 
was increasingly enforced, especially after the establishment of the first remote 
detention facility, Port Hedland, in 1991 and it was extended to all unlawful 
arrivals in the Migration Reform Act, 1992.  The gradual toughening of policy on 
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detention and deportation was largely a response to periodic increases in the 
number of unauthorised arrivals.  From 1996/7 onshore grants of asylum were 
included within the 12,000 target so that they would effectively reduce the 
numbers accepted through the offshore programs (see Table 1).   
In response to a further surge of arrivals, legislation was passed in 1999 that 
created three-year Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs), with much reduced rights, 
for unauthorised arrivals who qualify for protection.  TPVs confer the right to 
work and to certain benefits, including Medicare, but a TPV holder is not entitled 
to re-enter Australia, once having left, and is not entitled to bring to Australia 
other family members.  TPV holders were eligible to apply for permanent 
protection after 30 months, a status that could be granted only where the need for 
protection was ongoing.  Offshore refugees were normally given Permanent 
Protection Visas in the first instance, but from 2003 these were replaced with 
TPVs.  Those who are accorded permanent protection are in a similar position to 
immigrants with Permanent Resident Visas, in that they can become eligible for 
family reunification and for citizenship.  The introduction of TPVs was followed 
by legislation which imposed sanctions on people-smugglers and provided for the  
boarding, searching and detention of ships suspected of carrying unauthorised 
asylum seekers.   
From 1996 the Australian government urged other countries, particularly 
Indonesia and Malaysia, to tighten controls on potential asylum seekers transiting 
through their territories, and it reached a formal agreement with the former to 
intercept asylum seekers on their way to Australia.  In October 1999 the 
government initiated an ‘overseas information campaign’ aimed at discouraging 
unauthorised arrivals.  It included posters, videos and media clips that were 
targeted at countries of origin and transit and distributed in local languages.  This 
campaign was seen as largely ineffective.  But the arrival of the MV Tampa on the 
scene was to change all that: it provided the kind of publicity that media 
campaigns could not buy at any price (see USCR, 2002; Hathaway, 2002).  During 
the week-long standoff at Christmas Island the world’s press feasted on the plight 
of the asylum seekers (mainly Afghans), and on the government’s hard line in 
refusing to allow them to land.  (Whether Australia’s actions were consistent with 
international law is a debated issue — according to Hathaway (2002), it depends 
largely on the interpretation of the non-refoulement clause in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.)  Eight days after their rescue, the asylum seekers were transferred to 
an Australian naval ship the Manoora, which also picked up a further 200 (mainly 
Iraqi) asylum seekers from another boat, taking them all to Nauru.  A further wave 
of publicity followed when some of the latter refused to disembark at Nauru.  And 
the publicity continued with the arrival of a further six boats in the next month, 
several of which were ‘pushed’ back out to sea.1  By that time the whole world 
knew about Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’.   
                                                          
1  One of these, carrying 187 Iraqis, was boarded by naval personnel from the Australian 
ship the Adelaide. The Prime Minister reported to the media that some of these asylum 
seekers had reacted by throwing their children overboard — a claim that was later denied 
by senior naval officials.    
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Exactly a month after the Tampa rescue, the Australian Senate passed six new 
Bills into law to toughen the asylum regime further.  The first two involved the 
excision of Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef and some other small islands from 
Australian territory for the purposes of establishing claims to asylum in Australia, 
and they provided for such arrivals to be processed elsewhere.  Applicants who 
had spent at least 7 days in a ‘safe’ country prior to arriving in Australia were 
denied eligibility for a permanent protection visa.  Another Act significantly 
narrowed the definition of a refugee used in the status determination procedure to 
the minimum required by the Refugee Convention.  Further provisions included 
introducing harsher penalties for people smuggling offences and limiting access to 
judicial review of migration decisions.  With these new regulations in place the 
Pacific Solution was complete, and by most accounts it helped the Howard 
government to win the election held on 10 November 2001.   
Asylum Policies in Other Countries 
In the sections that follow, we assess the effects of policy by comparing trends in 
asylum applications to Australia before and after 2001 with those of other 
countries.  Here we focus on the main English speaking countries of the developed 
world — Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States — as 
key comparators, plus France and Germany.  Since a number of these countries 
also introduced changes in their asylum policies in 2001 we need to take those into 
account as well.   
Like Australia, neighbouring New Zealand has onshore and offshore refugee 
programmes although on a much smaller scale, with an offshore quota of 750 per 
year.  The number of spontaneous (onshore) applications was very small, but it 
rose sharply from the late 1980s, exceeding a thousand per year from the mid-
1990s onwards.  And like Australia, only a small proportion of these applications 
(about 10 percent) were approved, although larger proportion were granted 
temporary protection.  In 1999 the Immigration Amendment Act provided that 
undocumented arrivals could be placed in a detention centre rather than being 
granted a temporary visa, and it strengthened the power to deport them without the 
right of appeal.  But it was not until after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Centre in the US on 11 September 2001 that this was enforced on the bulk of 
undocumented arrivals.   
The United States and Canada also receive refugees through a combination of 
organised programmes and spontaneous applications.  The US tightened its policy 
on unauthorised arrivals with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996.  In the wake of September 11th 2001 the USA Patriot 
Act introduced tougher measures against those with suspected links to terrorist 
associations and in 2002 the US commenced fingerprinting all asylum applicants.  
Canada followed with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 that 
brought its legislation more into line with that of the US.  The measures also 
included speeding up processing and tougher policy on removals.  It also agreed 
with the US a ‘safe third country’ policy:  that asylum seekers would have their 
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claims examined only by the country of first arrival.  Most of the spontaneous 
asylum applicants to Canada filed their applications at ports of entry at the border 
with the US, having first travelled through the US.  Under the safe third country 
policy an applicant whose claim was rejected in one country would not be eligible 
for consideration by the other country. 
In the UK a series of reforms have been undertaken, most notably in 1993, 
1996, 1999 and 2002 that progressively toughened UK asylum law in the face of 
rising numbers of spontaneous applicants.  The 1993 Act introduced fast track 
procedures for claims deemed to be without foundation and it allowed detention 
for the first time.  The 1996 Act introduced the ‘safe third country’ concept, thus 
denying claims from applicants who had previously travelled through safe 
countries where they could have sought asylum.  It also restricted the availability 
of welfare benefits to asylum seekers.  In 1999 the concept of ‘manifestly 
unfounded’ applications was introduced, sanctions against carriers of 
undocumented immigrants were increased and asylum seekers in reception centres 
were more widely dispersed.  And finally, the 2002 Act introduced an ‘asylum 
registration card’ and required regular reporting of all asylum seekers.  In addition, 
an official list was introduced of ‘safe countries of origin’, applicants from which 
have their claims certified as clearly unfounded.   
The UK case is particularly interesting because the dramatic toughening of 
policy in the 1990s seemed to have so little effect on asylum applications (OECD, 
2001:256).  Although the vast majority of asylum applications were rejected, most 
undocumented asylum seekers were not kept under detention and a large 
proportion of those whose claims were rejected were not removed from the 
country.  Many simply went underground, living (and often working) as illegal 
immigrants.  In the wake of a record number of applications in 2002 the Prime 
Minister pledged in February 2003 that the number of applications would be cut in 
half by the following September.  This statement was based on the expected 
effects of the 2002 legislation (which came into effect between November 2002 
and February 2003) as well as a campaign within the government for more 
effective enforcement of existing deterrent measures.  And it was accompanied by 
a good deal of publicity, most of which expressed scepticism about whether the 
Prime Minister’s pledge was, in fact, deliverable.   
On the European continent, France and Germany both severely toughened 
their policies towards asylum seekers in the early 1990s.  These policies included 
carrier sanctions, ‘safe third country’ rules as well as procedures for expediting 
manifestly unfounded claims.  And, until very recently, both countries denied 
recognition to those who were persecuted by non-state agents.  Both countries 
provide benefits to asylum applicants in reception centres and Germany has a 
policy of dispersing asylum seekers across provinces (Länder).  But except for 
illegal immigrants apprehended at the border, neither country employs mandatory 
detention.  In 2001 Germany introduced anti-terror legislation that strengthened 
detention and deportation measures against suspected terrorists and it began to 
restrict the granting of humanitarian status to those who did not qualify as 
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Convention refugees.  But neither country introduced new deterrent measures 
comparable with those of Australia, New Zealand and the UK.   
Asylum Applications in Australia 
Annual data for the number of onshore asylum applications are shown in Figure 1.  
These may be compared with the figures in Table 1 for the number of applicants 
that were accepted as refugees in the onshore program.   
Figure 1: Asylum Applications and Unauthorised Boat Arrivals in 
Australia, 1989/90 to 2003/4 
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Onshore asylum applications peaked at over 13,000 in 1989/90 then fell off 
sharply before gradually rising to similar levels between 1999/2000 and 2001/2.  
The earlier peak is associated with applications from places like China and 
Cambodia, while the gradual rise from the early 1990s reflected increasing 
applications from a more diverse range of sources.  The lower graph shows the 
number of unauthorised individuals arriving by boat.  This figure increased 
sharply from 1997/8 to over 4,000 in each of the years 1999/2000 and 2000/1.  
The sharp fall in boat arrivals coincides with the much more restrictive 
environment post-Tampa.  But it is notable also that the total number of asylum 
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applications decreased by a far larger number — from 13,000 in 2000/1 down to 
5,000 in 2002/3 and only 3,500 in 2003/4.  
The exact timing of the decline in asylum applications can be seen more 
clearly in the monthly data for asylum applications plotted in Figure 2.  The 
monthly figures are more volatile but they averaged around 1000 a month up to 
September 2001 and then fell sharply thereafter to an average of close to 500 a 
month in 2002.  The timing of the fall strongly suggests that it was the Tampa 
incident and the raft of legislation that quickly followed it that was the cause.  
Although the monthly numbers were volatile in the period up to September 2001 
they fell decisively and remained relatively stable at the lower level thereafter.   
Figure 2: Monthly Asylum Applications to Australia, 2001 and 2002 
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In part this may reflect a decline in applications worldwide.  Figure 3 shows 
the trends in applications in each of the five countries mentioned above, with 
Quarter 3, 2001 set at an index of 100.  The graphs show that asylum applications 
to the English speaking countries were generally lower in 2002 and 2003 than 
before, but that applications to Australia fell more dramatically than any of the 
other countries.  Applications to New Zealand and Canada both drifted 
downwards from the end of 2001 and the same was true of the United States from 
the middle of 2002.  As we have seen, these countries each enacted legislation in 
2001 or 2002 and so part of the decline may be due to tougher legislative 
conditions facing asylum seekers rather than a fall in the desire to seek asylum.  
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The UK profile is particularly interesting because the numbers decline after the 
end of 2002, when legislation was followed by Tony Blair’s public commitment to 
halve the number of applicants.  Finally Figure 3 shows very divergent trends in 
two other EU countries, Germany and France.  While the trend of applications in 
Germany follows that of Canada and the United States, France appears to buck the 
trend, with a continuing rise in applications after 2001.   
Figure 3: Quarterly Asylum Applications in Selected Countries 
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One important difference between these countries is that origin country 
composition of their asylum applications varies widely.  Figure 4 shows the 
composition of applications by continent for 1997-99.   
Timothy Hatton and Audrey Lim 
 
124 
Figure 4: Origin of Asylum Applicants by Region, 1997-1999 
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The first bar in Figure 4 shows that the United States has a larger proportion 
of applications from Latin America and a smaller proportion from Asia than the 
other countries.  By contrast, Australia has the largest proportion from Asia and 
relatively small proportions from elsewhere.  The origin of asylum seekers varies 
widely across destinations for a variety of reasons, including proximity, language 
affinity and past history.  Since the eruption of civil wars and other sources of 
persecution vary year by year and country by country, the trends in total 
applications at different destinations will depend where in the world those 
conflicts occur as well as on differences in asylum policy.  Any assessment of the 
effects of policy needs to take this into account.   
Regression Analysis 
We first examine the quarterly data for total asylum applications that is shown in 
Figure 3.  Because the absolute numbers vary widely across countries, we take the 
log of total applications as the dependent variable and we include a dummy for 
each destination (not reported).  We estimate with a separate fixed effect for each 
quarter (19 fixed effects).  This accounts for the variations in applications that are 
due to changes in the conditions that affect refugee flights world-wide, and hence 
it avoids the need to find an aggregate measure for wars and upheavals in origin 
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countries.  The effects of policy are captured by destination specific dummies that 
change from zero to one in the quarter after the policy takes effect.  Since we also 
include individual destination country dummies over the whole period, the policy 
effects are essentially measured as differences-in-differences.   
The regressions in the first two columns of Table 2 include only the English-
speaking destination countries.  We include policy dummies taking the value one 
for Australia from 2001-Q4 onwards, for New Zealand, from 2002-Q1 onwards 
and for the UK from 2003-Q1 onwards.  Thus the trends captured by the period 
dummies also reflect the post-September 11th tightening of policy in the US and 
Canada and this serves as a benchmark of comparison for the policy effects in 
other countries.  As column (1) shows the policy dummies have statistically 
significant negative effects on applications for New Zealand from the beginning of 
2002 and for the UK from the beginning of 2003.  These seem consistent with the 
policy changes outlined earlier and with the patterns displayed in Figure 3.  For 
Australia the coefficient on the dummy that represents the ‘Tampa effect’ is large 
and highly significant.  This coefficient implies a drop in asylum applications of 
55.5 percent as compared with 28.8 percent for New Zealand and 24.4 percent for 
the UK from 2003.   
Table 2:  Estimates of Policy Effects: Quarterly Data 
(Fixed effects regression; Dependent variable: log applications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New Zealand Dummy  
(from 2002-Q1) 
-0.34 
(4.1) 
-0.27 
(2.5) 
-0.35 
(3.7) 
-0.21 
(1.9) 
UK Dummy 
(from 2003-Q2) 
-0.28 
(3.3) 
-0.25 
(2.8) 
-0.34 
(3.7) 
-0.27 
(2.7) 
Australia Dummy 
(from 2001-Q4) 
-0.81 
(9.7) 
-0.77 
(8.3) 
-0.82 
(8.7) 
-0.74 
(7.4) 
Germany Dummy 
(from 2002-Q1) 
  -0.19 
(2.0) 
-0.22 
(2.4) 
France Dummy 
(from 2002-Q1) 
  0.52 
(5.4) 
0.58 
(5.9) 
Unemployment rate  
(t-1) 
 0.04 
(1.0) 
 0.08 
(2.2) 
R2 (within) 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.83 
No.  Obs. 95 95 133 133 
HETERO, χ2 (1) 0.00 0.03 0.19 1.09 
RESET, F(3, n-k-3) 0.25 0.23 1.38 0.45 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses.  Nineteen quarterly country 
observations by 5 countries in columns (1) and (2) and by 7 countries in columns 
(3) and (4).  Also included is a fixed effect for each quarter and a set of country 
dummies.   
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A number of studies have found that the flow of asylum applications also 
depends on labour market conditions in the destination (see Hatton 2004).  
Accordingly, column (2) includes the unemployment rate lagged one period, but 
contrary to expectation, this turns out to be positive and insignificant.  Column (3) 
extends the dataset to include Germany and France and it includes ‘policy’ 
dummies for these countries that take the value one for 2002-Q1 onwards.  
Although the policy effects for the English-speaking countries are not much 
changed, the dummies for France and Germany are significantly positive and 
negative respectively.  Adding the unemployment rate has little effect on these 
coefficients although unemployment itself now becomes significantly positive, as 
shown in column (4). 
These results for Germany and France caution us that the destination-specific 
dummies that are interpreted here as policy effects may, in fact, owe something to 
other underlying trends specific to each destination.  As noted earlier, one of these 
is differences across destinations in the mix of asylum applications by country of 
origin.  In order to investigate further we turn to analyzing data for applications by 
origin and destination.  Here, only annual data are available and we have to drop 
New Zealand as a destination since there are too few observations for different 
origins.  Our dataset for the years 1997 to 2003 includes 17 source countries, 
drawn from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe (see Data Appendix).   
We take as the dependent variable the log of the number of applications from 
a given origin to a given destination and we include destination-specific dummies.  
The policy dummies take the value one for 2002 and 2003 for each destination 
(2003 only for the UK).  In order to account for the ebb and flow of origin-specific 
conflict we estimate using a fixed effect for each source and time period (17 
sources × 7 years = 119 fixed effects).  But we also need to allow for the 
differences in applications across destination/origin pairs that are due to factors 
such as proximity or historic and cultural links.  We allow for these effects by 
including an additional variable: the stock of source country nationals who were 
living in the destination country in 1996 — immediately preceding our data 
period.  This can be viewed as a variant of the migrant stock or ‘friends and 
relatives effect’ that is often found to be important in studies of migration (Hatton 
and Williamson, 2005).   
Because there is a larger cross-sectional element in these regressions, the 
coefficients in Table 3 are not as precisely estimated as those in Table 2 and the 
overall explanatory power (as reflected by the R2) is lower.  Again the US and 
Canada are taken as the baseline for comparison.  The result in column (1) for the 
English speaking countries alone gives a coefficient on the policy dummy for 
Australia that is similar to that obtained with quarterly data.  The coefficient is 
significant and it implies that the Tampa effect was to reduce applications by 62.1 
percent.  The policy effect for the UK is similar to that found in the quarterly data 
but it is not significant.  In column (2) the coefficient on unemployment is still 
positive but its inclusion has little effect on the magnitudes of the other 
coefficients.  In these regressions the stock of origin-country population living in 
the destination country is strongly significant, as other studies have found.  The 
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coefficient implies that increasing the stock from an origin country by 1,000 
increases the annual flow of asylum applications by 9.2 persons per annum. 
Table 3:  Estimates of Policy Effects: Annual Data 
(Fixed effects regression; dependent variable:  log applications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UK Dummy 
(2003) 
-0.35 
(1.0) 
-0.30 
(0.7) 
-0.31 
(1.0) 
-0.37 
(1.0) 
Australia Dummy 
(2002-3) 
-0.97 
(3.1) 
-0.91 
(2.7) 
-0.97 
(3.3) 
-1.01 
(3.2) 
Germany Dummy 
(2002-3) 
  -0.54 
(1.5) 
-0.53 
(1.5) 
France Dummy 
(2002-3) 
  0.50 
(1.8) 
0.46 
(1.5) 
Log Foreign Stock 
(1996) 
0.44 
(9.4) 
0.44 
(5.1) 
0.51 
(9.1) 
0.51 
(9.1) 
Unemployment rate  
(t) 
 0.04 
(0.2) 
 -0.04 
(0.3) 
R2 (within) 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.37 
No.  Obs. 469 469 700 700 
RESET, F(3, n-k-3) 3.03 3.14 1.22 1.22 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by origin and date.  Seven 
annual observations by 17 origin countries by 4 destinations in columns (1) and (2) 
and by 6 destinations in columns (3) and (4).  The full dataset is reduced from 714 
to 700 observations because of missing data on applications from Indonesia to the 
UK and France.  Also included in the regressions are fixed effects for each origin 
by year and dummies for each destination 
 
 
Extending the dataset to Germany and France in columns (3) and (4) affects 
the policy dummies for the other countries only slightly.  The dummies for France 
and Germany in 2002-3 are positive and negative respectively, just as they were in 
the quarterly data regressions.  And although the coefficients are large, neither is 
significant.  Overall, the results are consistent with those that were obtained from 
the quarterly data in one important respect: they consistently indicate that asylum 
applications fell after the Tampa affair by more than half.  But the effect for the 
UK in 2003 has become insignificant, perhaps because it is identified from only 
one year of data.  While the coefficients for France and Germany in 2002-3 remain 
surprisingly large they also lose significance.  It seems likely that the negative 
coefficient for Germany reflects a shift in applications towards the EU accession 
countries, which received a growing number of applications in anticipation of the 
eastward expansion of the EU’s borders.  But there is no obvious explanation of 
the upward trend for France.   
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Conclusion 
There has been a significant tightening in asylum policies all over the world in 
recent years.  Most developed countries have increased their scrutiny of arrivals 
since 11 September 2001, especially those from regions that generate asylum 
seekers.  Certain countries have implemented more draconian policies, with 
Australia being the best-known example, followed by New Zealand and the UK.  
In each case the data reveal a decline in applications, suggesting that the 
respective governments achieved their aims of effectively deterring asylum 
applications.  But given changing conditions in source countries and the changing 
attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees worldwide, it is not sufficient 
simply to observe the trend in applications for one country alone.  The effects of 
policy can only be isolated by comparing different destinations and by controlling 
for changing conditions in origin countries.   
Our estimates largely confirm the trends that are observed in the raw data.  
The analysis of quarterly data gives particularly clear results: the ‘Tampa effect’ 
for Australia was to reduce asylum applications by more than a half.  There were 
also significant reductions in applications to New Zealand from the beginning of 
2002 and to the UK from the beginning of 2003.  But the results also indicate a 
significant fall in applications to Germany and a significant increase in France 
from the end of 2001.  When we disaggregate by country of origin, these results 
are largely confirmed although they are weaker in the annual data.  The fall in 
Australian applications after 2001 remains large and significant, although the 
policy effects for the UK seem to be much weaker in the annual data.   
The results presented here suggest that, when tough asylum policies are 
enforced and when they are widely publicized, the effects on applications can be 
dramatic.  The most important deterrent polices are restricting access to territory 
combined with punitive detention and deportation policies that prevent illegal 
arrivals from assimilating into the host community even though their asylum 
applications are unsuccessful.  In addition, the Tampa incident served to 
communicate Australia’s tough stance to the world and it seems to have 
discouraged applications even among legal arrivals.  There are two remaining 
caveats.  First, even when the ebb and flow of conflict in source regions is taken 
into account, there are other forces that determine the trends in asylum 
applications that are still not fully understood.  The second is that while policy 
seems to have been particularly effective in reducing applications in Australia, and 
to a lesser extent in New Zealand and the UK, this should not be taken as an 
argument in favour of such policies.  The fact that they are effective does not 
necessarily mean that they are desirable. 
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Data Appendix 
The main sources of data for asylum applications were UNHCR reports that can 
be found on the UNHCR website at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/statistics.  Data for quarterly asylum applications for the first quarter 
of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2002 can be located in Table 2 of the UNHCR 
report, Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: Levels And 
Trends, 2000 — 2002 while data for the remaining quarters until 2004:3 were 
extracted from Table 1 of Asylum Levels And Trends In Industrialized Countries – 
Third Quarter 2004.  The former report also provided annual figures for asylum 
applications disaggregated by the origin of asylum applicants and their country of 
asylum for the years 2000 to 2002.  Annual data preceding these years were taken 
from the statistical annex of Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 
1980 — 1999.  It is not possible to extend the dataset to the years before 1997 
because the Australian data on applications by origin are not sufficiently detailed, 
with just a few origin countries listed and the rest included under ‘other and 
unknown’.  We acquired the 2003 data from Table 8 of the 2003 Global Refugee 
Trends report.  Additional data that were not available in the published reports 
were kindly provided by Christian Oxenboll of the UNHCR.  For the UK revised 
annual data were obtained from UK Home Office, Asylum Statistics, United 
Kingdom 2003 (2nd edn): http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/hosb1104.pdf.   
The 17 source countries used in the annual analysis are: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from Asia; 
Algeria, Nigeria and Somalia from Africa; and Albania, the Russian Federation, 
Turkey and Ukraine from Europe.  Data for the stock of migrants from these 17 
source countries who were residing in one of the 6 destination countries in 1996 
were drawn from two main sources.  The data for the UK, Germany and France on 
the stock of foreign nationals were obtained from the Council of Europe 
Demographic Yearbook for 2002 at:  http://www.oecd.org.  For France the closest 
available year is 1999.  For the US, Canada and Australia the stock of the foreign-
born population was taken from the Migration Information Source website at:  
http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/.  Missing observations for the 
US were estimated by adjusting the 1990 Census numbers using the change in the 
foreign-born from the origin region between 1990 and 1996.  US 1990 Census 
data were taken from Census Bureau, Population Division, Technical Working 
Paper No. 29, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the 
United States:  1850-1990 (by Campbell Gibson and Emily Lennon) at: 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html.  
All unemployment data were drawn from the OECD.  Quarterly 
unemployment rates were accessed through the dX database, while the annual 
rates were taken from the statistical annex of the OECD Economic Outlook No.  
76 (2004) EO76 Annex Tables at http://www.oecd.org. 
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